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Farewell to the
SWEDISH 
MODEL
Sweden was the exemvlarfor the thinking labour 
movement in the 80s. Now, it seems, the model's come 
apart at the seams. Andrew Vandenbergand G eoff 
Dow observe the rise of economic austerity, Swedish style.
T
he last 12 months have not been good 
for Sweden's Social Democratic Party 
(SAP). In February, the government 
resigned after failing to obtain support 
in the riksdag (parliam ent) for a series of 
measures ostensibly designed to control infla­
tion but which included a proposal to prohibit 
industrial action among public sector unions. 
Support for these measures had been garnered 
from the trade union leadership— to the surprise 
and consternation of those who recognised the 
departure from Swedish policy-making tradi­
tions. After a few weeks, the government was 
re in sta ted , w ith a d ifferen t treasu rer and 
diminished credibility.
When the party commenced its September 1990 congress, 
its self-proclaimed task was to convince itself that it had 
the vision and administrative acumen to guide the country 
and social democracy in the decade ahead. Party officials 
had prepared not only a platform but a much more sub­
stantial Program for the Nineties. This 285-page document
purports to be as important as the 1944 Post War Program 
associated largely with Ernst Wigforss and Alva and Gun- 
nar Myrdal, which legitimated the "industrial efficiency 
through social security" model that has since characterised 
the Swedish welfare state. Complete with quotations from 
Socrates, the program reiterates the labour movement's 
commitment to equality, full employment and collectivism 
and includes a detailed discussion of environmental, 
worklife, public sector and economic policy issues.
Despite the congress atmosphere, including red banners 
and a final rendition of The Internationale in Stockholm’s 
Folketshus, the party failed to convince an increasingly 
hostile electorate or its increasingly disillusioned trade- 
union wing that it understands 'the Swedish model'.
The February crisis had an even more austere sequel in 
October. The government now seems willing to adopt the 
orthodox measures urged upon them by employers, the 
OECD and many of their own economic advisers. These 
emphatic policy reversals were quite unheralded at the 
party congress a month earlier. With hindsight it is ap­
parent that they must have been long contemplated by the 
leadership group.
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Paralleling the changes in post-Cold War Europe, Sweden 
is recharting its political and economic course towards an 
orthodox conformity with the world economy. The 
government's policies in recent years mirror the interna­
tional trend towards liberalisation, deregulation, 
decentralisation and competition.
Publicly, SAP politicians continue to proclaim a commit­
ment to full employment and equality, but the trade union 
movement is concerned that full employment and social 
welfare might be sacrificed in the near future. The party 
has departed from its former preparedness to guarantee, 
via institutions, high levels of economic activity, and there­
fore low levels of inequality. The industrial sector now 
predicts (or threatens) unemployment of 4% or more as it 
reorients its operations towards the new Europe. The 
government has announced a definite intention to seek 
membership of the EEC. It is presenting this, and the 
Introduction of competition into the social welfare delivery 
system, as indications of its decisiveness, realism and 
flexibility. For the unions, the break-up of centralised wage 
negotiation forums, employer recalcitrance and the loss of 
influence on government policy represent a new political 
dimate.
Domestic conditions in Sweden have become much less 
conducive to an exceptional set of standards and expecta­
tions than they were even as late as the 1970s. The Social 
Democrats, who have governed for 52 of the last 58 years, 
lag seriously in opinion polls. Even worse, the party has 
lost its inclination to contemplate distinctive programs of 
socialist reform, preferring to steer the party platform 
towards conventionality. Conservative voices, particularly 
theinfluentialand aggressive employers' federation (SAF), 
have managed to seize the initiative in public debate from 
the social democrats and the trade unions. Such changes 
have occurred in the past five years or so after several 
decades of unusually coherent policy development by the 
labour movement which successfully combined high 
material standards with distributive equity.
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Social democrats should be aware from history that a 
commitment to permanent full employment may provoke 
reaction and opposition, yet the politicians have been con­
tent to mouth slogans without discernible concern for their 
institutional requirements. Disappointment of supporters' 
expectations by mass parties of the Left is, of course, not a 
uniquely Swedish phenomenon, but the recent disregard 
of non-inflationary full employment has still angered 
many in the party, especially those like Gosta Rehn and 
Rudolf Meidner who have spent most of their adult lives 
refining a social democratic policy model which worked 
without resorting to repression or deflation.
Very little discussion of principles occurred at the party's 
congress. Instead, debate concentrated on several specific, 
controversial policy issues. The congress dismissed recom­
mendations by the party executive on visits by nuclear­
armed warships; it amended the executive's suggestions 
to adopt only vague compromise resolutions on childcare 
and on the dismantling of nuclear power; and it gave the 
leadership an open mandate to settle the controversies 
over advertising on broadcast television, over a bridge 
instead of a tunnel to Denmark and, perhaps most impor­
tant of all, over membership of the European Community.
It is difficult to explain entirely the motivation and pres­
sures behind this change of direction. Is the pertinent 
question: why have the Swedish Social Democrats 
abrogated past commitments? Or is it: why have neo­
liberal ideas had such an impact on policy-making since 
the mid-1970&—first in the Anglo-saxon countriesand now 
in Scandinavia? How do we explain the paradoxical 
propensity of contemporary government to produce 
policies that systematically undermine national economic 
capacity, while threatening in the process their own elec­
toral survival? There is, after all, plenty of evidence that 
domestic policy priorities can affect domestic outcomes, 
for good or ill, regardless of what is happening in the 
international sphere. Sweden is not the only source of this 
evidence. There seems to be both more narrow political and 
broader structural forces at work.
In Sweden the immediate reasons for what seem to be 
recent reversals of an effective model is the unexpected 
influence of conservative academic, governmental and in­
ternational economists. Corporate pressure to join the 
European Community has been especially strident, chal­
lenging even the country's long-standing tradition of 
neutrality. Organisations like Volvo and L M Ericsson now 
employ more workers outside Sweden than inside and 
have lost the commitment they once had to a strong or 
stable Swedish domestic economy. They would be happy 
to shift production to Belgium or Brazil and rarely miss an 
opportunity to remind the government that social 
democratic health, employment and workplace standards 
exceed those in other locations.
Politically, the employers' new strategy is to eliminate 
what remains of a distinctive model in Sweden by refusing 
to engage in any form of policy co-ordination with the 
unions or the government. The central employer organisa­
tion (SAF) is even closing down its research apparatus and 
disposing of the data once used for wage bargaining. An
altered domestic strategy is therefore being forged in the 
context of the increased internationalisation of the world 
economy, and the government's recent machinations 
reflect this new situation.
The labour movement's own strategy has been faltering 
for at least 20 years and perhaps, as Winton Higgins has 
maintained, since the 1950s. There has been little ideologi­
cal leadership—and certainly none to match Ernst 
Wigforss' reformist marxism—since the 1970s. In the 1950s 
and 1960s, the first generation of trade union economists 
were responsible for policies and institutions like the Na­
tional Labour Market Board (AMS) for dealing with infla­
tion, unemployment and wage solidarity problems. Since 
then, too little attention has been paid to the slowly fester­
ing tensions between the party and the movement on 
implementation of distinctive economic policies.
A major failure has been the under-development of in­
dustry and investment policy in Sweden which, as a result, 
is dangerously reliant on about 100 export-oriented en­
gineering firms. Selective interventionism has operated in 
principle, especially with respect to employment policy, 
but investment and product development decisions are 
still made outside of public policy and with little regard to 
the national interest.
It is always difficult for leftist politicians to ignore the 
mainstream of policy advice and to pursue experimental 
policies opposed by the entire professional orthodoxy of 
economists. To do so involves the construction of an 'alter­
native accumulation strategy'—which, in turn, means an 
entirely different pattern of institutional power and con­
flict. Swedish Social Democrats showed themselves, 
during the wage-eamer funds campaign, to be unequal to 
such a struggle. During 1990 they lost whatever residual 
credibility they retained after their earlier routing by the 
employers.
By tradition, the SAPleaders take a strong interest in social 
democratic ideology. During a very polarised 1982 election 
campaign dominated by the wage earner funds issue 
former leader Olof Palme proclaimed, "Yes, I'm a 
democratic socialist". But to the same question, the leader 
and prime minister since 1986, Ingvar Carlsson, sub­
sequently responded, "I'm a social democrat and that's 
enough for me”.
In the party's theoretical journal Tiden and again in one of 
his three major congress speeches, Carlsson has tried to put 
his own stamp on the party's ideology by arguing that | 
social democracy cannot be regarded, fundamentally, as a 
matter of public administration and economic regulation. I 
It must be a system of values: freedom, equality, fraternity 
and solidarity.
An eyebrow or two was raised at the congress when 
Carlsson attacked "the true believers, the supposedly real 
socialists'’ . "Early on," he argued, "the social democrats j 
realised that it was not who owned but who controlled the 
means of production that was decisive." He argued, there- | 
fore, that control over production has been constrained by j 
legislation, a strong trade union movement and economic
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policy. This view of a gradual expansion of democratic 
influence over the private owners of capital makes the SAP 
indistinguishable from the Swedish liberals; it is indicative 
of the party's apparent renunciation of a distinctive profile. 
Carisson's view of social democracy is also at odds with 
the more explicitly socialist ambitions developed by the 
SAP-affiliated Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) in the 
mid-1970s.
The LCy s democratic socialism evolved independently of 
the SAFs ideology during the 1950s and 1960s. A distinct 
LO position crystallised in 1976 when the union 
economists presented their wage earner funds proposal. 
The LO's argument was that ownership of capital could 
not be ignored by a movement trying to take a responsible 
approach to macroeconomic conditions. Collective owner­
ship would change the unequal distribution of wealth and 
income, the anti-social and anti-democratic organisation of 
production and the chronic instability of economic activity. 
This stance challenged employers'rights to such an extent 
that they began a campaign to dismantle the Swedish 
model.
Whereas Palme tolerated some inconsistencies between 
the SAP's rhetoric and its actual policies, Carlsson and his 
confidants have sought greater correspondence between 
the government's actions and the party's ideology—per­
haps to appease the business community internationally. 
But the Prime Minister's arguments against trade-offs be­
tween freedom, equality and efficiency do stake out a 
strong rhetorical position opposed to liberals—perhaps 
largely for the sake of quelling disquiet in the ranks.
The party's failure of resolve has arisen at a time when a 
number of independent issues have forced themselves 
onto the political agenda. While not uncontroversial, these 
are not at the core of social democracy. Nonetheless, how 
they are being handled by the party is affecting the way in 
which the government itself is able to define and redefine 
broader ideological matters.
The labour movement is deeply divided, for example, on 
the issue of nuclear power. By obligation to its members in 
the energy-intensive forestry and paper mill industries, the 
LO is wary of the government's sympathy for calls to close 
all 13 existing nuclear power plants by 2010. In 1985, after 
Chernobyl, the government declared that the closures 
should be completed by 2010 and that the oldest plants 
would cease operation by about 1995. Furthermore, the 
government also undertook not to allow any increase in 
the country's dependence on imported oil and gas, any 
increase in carbon dioxide pollution, or the damming of 
the last two wild rivers in the country.
A few days before the Gulf war started, the prime minister 
and the leaders of the liberal and centre parties announced 
that they had reached a compromise on the vexed issue of 
when tostait closing down the nuclear power plants. They 
agreed on greater spending for research into alternative 
energy sources and they agreed that—one way or 
another—Swedish electricity prices must retain parity 
with international prices. The details disappeared, of 
course, in the flood of dramatic war news so it is difficult
to gauge whether the issue has gone into hibernation or 
whether voters and unionists worried about their jobs will 
support the government for its decisiveness.
Important divisions remain too in a policy arena which has 
become a crucial indicator of the social democrats' commit­
ment to the "folkhem''—a powerful and longstanding 
image of the welfare state as 'the people's home'. Parental 
leave and childcare are important parts of the Swedish 
welfare system that have been somewhat mishandled by 
the SAP recently. In 1985, the government promised 
childcare places ("dagis") for all by 1991, However, 
Sweden's birth rate has jumped to the highest in the West 
and female participation in the labour market continues to 
increase. Chronic shortages of trained personnel in the 
major cities as well as local government budget constraints 
frustrated the high expectations.
The SAP originally promised to solve the problem of 
childcare by extending the system of public insurance for 
parental leave from work. After a volte-face, the govern­
ment eventually decided to lower the school-entry age, 
transfer seven-year-olds from the dagis to the schools and 
so create sufficient places for one and two-year-olds.
Notwithstanding this rather clever solution, the debate 
over childcare seems to indicate a reluctance by social 
democracy to continue the process of socialising family 
responsibilities. The issue should have been an easy one 
for Swedish Social Democrats to resolve: they have, after 
all, an enviable record on women's wages women's par­
ticipation in the workforce and the extension of societal 
responsibility for care of the elderly and children. The 
upshot of the prolonged party debate and tensions be­
tween central and local governments (which provide most 
welfare and childcare services) is that electorally sig­
nificant numbers of working parents have been provided 
with ready access to high quality day care centres. But there 
is also a lingering distrust about the social democrats' 
willingness or ability to honour election promises.
Despite all the policy preoccupations of the moment, the 
integrity of the social democratic model stands or falls on 
its claims to have a distinctive and successful approach to 
industry and the economy. It is now possible to argue that 
economic rationalism has affected economic policy* 
making in Sweden in a way that permanently impairs 
social democratic arrangements. Kjell-Olof Feldt is no 
longer treasurer, but his endeavour to purge the party of 
what he saw as its ideological anachronistic sacred cows 
continues.
What has differentiated the Swedish approach to full 
employment and equality from lip-service acceptance of 
similar goals by labour parties in the Anglo-saxon world 
has been the Swedes' preparedness and ability to translate 
the ideals into effective policies and institutions. The dif­
ficulty of the struggle, over many decades, makes the Social 
Democrats' current retreats all the more disheartening.
Inequalities of income always happen in times of un­
employment and it is at such times that orthodox economic 
advice can readily stampede governments into contradic­
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tory policy positions which only make things worse. Full 
employment demamds what Ernst Wigforss, social 
democratic activist from 1904 to 1974 and treasurer (1926, 
1932-49) referred to as'open-ended intervention'. In prac­
tice, this meant counter-cyclical macro-economic policies 
in the 1930s, separate institutions to facilitate relocation or 
retraining of displaced employees in the 1950s, and a 
commitment by the trade unions to organised restructur­
ing of the economy all through the post-war period.
Swedish economic policy would never have become a 
'model' if the highly unionised and centrally organised 
workforce had not been so influential in economic policy 
debates. Veteran strategists Rehn and Meidner still figure 
prominently, though joylessly, in discussions on how to 
secure full employment without inflation. Their efforts led 
to the unions' adoption in the late 1950s of a 'wages policy 
of solidarity'. Uniform increases, calculated by reference to 
the profitability of firms in the most profitable sector, were 
to be paid to all workers according to the principle 'equal 
pay for equal work'. Firms with a low capacity to pay 
would be forced out of business. Profitable firms, whose 
workforce exercised considerable 'market restraint' in 
wage negotiations, were to prosper and so provide a 
private market impetus to structural change. Employers 
participated in these arrangements in order to avert 
government involvement in incomes policy and to reduce 
the strike rate.
The Rehn-Meidner model was successful in producing an 
efficient private sector and distributive equality because 
unions were able to insist that the government adopt sup­
portive social welfare policies and establish institutions in 
the employment and industrial relations arenas. Essential, 
too, are the high taxes and the associated non-discretionary 
incomes which have been able, especially since the 1970s, 
to 'decommodify' (that is, disentangle from market de­
pendence) many of the services that contribute to Swedes' 
living standards.
The 'Swedish model' should therefore be characterised as 
social welfare universalism—that is, generous entitle­
ments to all citizens, not just the needy— and specific, 
selective, interventions in the economy. Its opposite is the 
' Anglo-saxon model': targeted and discriminatory welfare 
supports with indiscriminate assistance to industry usual­
ly unrelated to performance.
Employers since the 1970s they have undermined the 
central elements of the Swedish model. For example, they 
have used the profit windfalls they secured as a result of 
the 1982 devaluation to bid up wages for highly skilled on 
highly favoured workers. There is now a worrying profit- 
led, wage-drift inflation of around 10%. SAF has changed 
its function, since the wage-earner funds campaign, from 
an industrial relations negotiating body toan anti-socialist 
propaganda machine.
Public scepticism about the Social Democrats' economic 
policy performance derives as much from internal labour 
movement squabbles as from the highly publicised break­
down of the centralised negotiation processes. In response 
to complaints from employers that Swedish wage and
employment conditions cost too much, and to their threats 
to reinvest, or even relocate, elsewhere in Europe, LO has 
recently advocated successive currency devaluation to re­
store competitiveness for Swedish-based producers. 
Trea surer Larsson then accused the LO economists of aban­
doning the fight against inflation. This was ironic, since it 
was LO that had given the slogan 'hate inflation' consid­
erable prominence in the 1950s. The government position 
is now to urge, in threatening tones, 'the labour market 
partners' to accept responsibility for stabilisation but 
without a supporting wages policy. This situation led, in 
December 1990, to a stinging public attack by LO's chair­
person Stig Malm on the government's approach in 
general and on the treasurer in particular. Malm was forced 
to apologise but then received criticism from within the 
unions for his apparent accession to the government view.
The employers pointedly abstain from any discussion, let 
alone binding agreement, with LO. So they reap instead 
the propaganda rewards that accrue from their own non­
involvement. LO's authority is weakening as many of its 
constituent unions and their members are wooed away 
from centrally decreed restraints by employers' in­
dividualised offers. Subsequent demands for catch-up in­
creases from other employees then exacerbate the 
problems that any solidarity wage policy must address. 
The unions know that pronouncements they might make 
along these lines would be ineffective because, given high 
profits, individual employees can easily bargain for in­
dividual wage increases and ignore their own organisa­
tions.
The impossibility of expecting unions to bear respon­
sibility for profit-led inflation is precisely the 'old problem' 
that Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner addressed in the 
1950s. It has returned in the 1980sand 1990s partly because 
the government failed to implement the 'profit squeeze' 
aspects of the model even in its heyday and partly because 
the government's acceptance of a distinctive approach to 
economic stabilisation has always lagged behind the LO1 s.
It should be remembered that most of these problems due 
to the departure of Swedish policy from the Swedish 
model not because it is following the model. Policy never 
has followed the model, completely. As Rudolf Meidner 
recently said: it always was difficult, there always was 
internal conflict, the party always held back public debate. 
Perhaps there needs to be a period of electoral opposition 
before LO is able to reassert itself; but it seems unlikely that 
Ingvar Carlsson's command of social democratic principle 
is sufficient to allow him to avert the slide towards 
liberalism and impending electoral loss. Full employment 
remains a genuine achievement in Sweden, but there are 
few left who remember how it was done.
The farce has become tragic because there was once a 
coherent alternative to economists' cynicism: it was called 
the Swedish model.
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